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TERRITORIALITY AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE:
NOTES FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Chris Brummer*

For all of the attention brought to bear on global financial regulation,
relatively little scholarly energy has been directed towards thinking
through the mechanics of how national regulators govern
international pools of capital via their domestic rulemaking authority.
This Article responds to this weak link in the literature by providing a
short conceptual overview of the operationalization of supervisory
power by national regulatory authorities. It argues that “territorial”
authority in financial regulation—commonly considered both a source
and limitation of control over local firms—in practice constitutes a
diverse array of tactics employed by national authorities to exert
authority over mobile market participants. As such, it can facilitate
the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders,
especially for countries enjoying large capital and customer markets.
This Article then contextualizes territoriality against the backdrop of
financial globalization and shows how the “rise of the rest” changes
the international regulatory order as other countries have developed
their own liquid financial centers and means of (extra)territorial
influence. Specifically, this Article argues that as emerging markets
have become more important, the costs of unilateral territorialism and
non-cooperation by traditionally dominant countries have increased,
which has helped spur new efforts at international coordination, as
well as innovative initiatives aimed at leveraging hard and soft power
to promote national policy preferences abroad. Nevertheless, this
Article concludes that territoriality remains a central element in
international coordination and the bargaining process.

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Hannah Buxbaum,
Romulus Johnson, Peter Kerstens, Erin O’Hara and Eric Pan for their comments, as well as to Barbara
Black and participants at the 2010 University of Cincinnati College of Law Corporate Law Symposium,
“Globalization of Securities Regulation: Competition or Coordination.”
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INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis has brought unprecedented attention to the
need for heightened international coordination and cooperation among
regulators. As the repercussions of the financial crisis have moved from
the United States to Europe and the rest of the world, policymakers now
largely acknowledge the economic risks that arise where large financial
institutions transact across the globe as investors, insurers, and
counterparties. 1
And recent financial scandals have once again
highlighted with painful clarity the increasingly international
repercussions of fraud and bad acts by financial firms and their
management. 2 It is not surprising that the demand for greater collective
action among regulators has grown exponentially since the crisis first
upended the global economy undermined investors’ faith in financial
markets.
Yet for all of the attention brought to bear on global financial
regulation, relatively little scholarly attention has been directed toward
thinking through the mechanics of how national regulators govern
international pools of capital via their domestic rulemaking authority. 3
Specifically, although scholars have long recognized the extraterritorial

1. See, e.g., Declaration, Group of Twenty, Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf
(noting the need for achieving greater transparency internationally for complex securities and financial
instruments in order to promote investor protection).
2. See Martha Brannigan, SEC Accuses Stanford Group Owner of Massive Ongoing Fraud,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17, 2009, at 1 (reporting the alleged worldwide fraud perpetrated by Robert Allen
Stanford’s investment company, especially in Latin America); Joanna Chung, Half of Madoff Loss
Borne by Foreigners, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at 16 (detailing the global nature of Bernie Madoff
ponzie scheme); Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Riva D. Atlas, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Hobbled
Enron Tries to Stay on Its Feet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C1 (noting that Japanese money market
funds took a “beating” because of their Enron holdings); Reuters, Parmalat Is Sued on Behalf of U.S.
Investors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at C3 (reporting that Parmalat, though headquartered in Italy,
allegedly caused $1.5 billion in losses for U.S. investors).
3. This is not to say, however, that scholars have failed to identify the challenges regulators face
when attempting to carry out their domestic regulatory mandates. For just a sampling of the writing on
the subject, see William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment Differences and Political
Realities in the GAAP–IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989, 1007 (2009); Howell E. Jackson, Toward a
New Regulatory Paradigm for the Trans-Atlantic Financial Market and Beyond: Legal and Economic
Perspectives, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/workshops/open/papers0708/jackson.paper.pdf; Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities
Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191 (2008); Joel Trachtman, Regulatory
Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (2000). Indeed, perhaps Claire Kelly
and Roberta Karmel have most consistently addressed regulatory export in their analysis of transatlantic
securities regulation, though even they do not provide a theoretical framework for assessing the issue
generally. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 1711
(2008) (noting that European integration has given the European Union more power in influencing
Securities and Exchange Commission decisionmaking).
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effects of various financial rules, the extraterritorial exertion of authority
is rarely examined as a regulatory technique. Instead, extraterritoriality
is analyzed in the context of the extensive “conflicts of law” literature
that focuses on how courts determine which law is to be applied where
different governments assert jurisdiction. 4
Though critical to
understanding the international reach of national rules, this back-end
focus on judicial decisionmaking overlooks the strategic front-end
considerations and tactics of national regulatory agencies where
achieving domestic policy objectives requires actions with international
import.
This Article, prepared for the 2010 Corporate Law Symposium
sponsored by the University of Cincinnati College of Law, responds to
this under-explored issue in legal scholarship. It provides a typology of
dominant regulatory techniques employed by financial regulators and
then contextualizes these strategies by exploring their implications in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In doing so, this Article provides
a framework for viewing the role of national regulators as sources of
international financial law and provides an assessment for unilateral
regulatory power in the wake of the recent global financial turmoil.
To carry out its analysis, this Article scrutinizes the legal means by
which regulators unilaterally exert their influence. It argues that
“territorial” authority in financial regulation—routinely considered both
a source and limitation of control over local firms—in practice
constitutes a diverse array of tactics employed by national authorities to
exert authority over mobile market participants. As such, it can
facilitate the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders,
especially for countries enjoying large capital and customer markets.
This Article also argues, however, that territoriality faces significant
challenges in the wake of financial globalization, both in practical and
political terms as previously marginal or developing countries have
developed their own liquid financial centers and (extra)territorial
influence. These challenges, which have only been exacerbated in the
wake of the crisis, have spurred new efforts at international coordination
and innovative initiatives among traditional regulatory leaders aimed at
leveraging their residual hard and soft power to promote their national
policy preferences abroad. Nevertheless, territoriality remains an
4. For an overview of the diverse approaches used by U.S. courts, see, for example, Hannah L.
Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International
Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 225–26 (2001); Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the
“Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 262 (1999); Symeon
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the Century Turns, 49 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1 (2001); Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of
American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 617 (1961).
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important strategic factor informing the coordination process.
In an effort to demonstrate the importance of territoriality, Part I of
this Article provides an overview of the diverse mechanisms of
territorial regulation and pinpoints what can be considered the three
primary modes of territorial oversight. Part II problematizes the
exercise of territorial authority and explores how financial globalization
and the financial crisis have altered the strategic calculus underpinning
its use. Finally, Part III examines the regulators’ recent responses to the
changing political economy and predicts a lingering importance for the
territorial technique in financial regulatory affairs.
I. THREE MODES OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
A. Domestic Territoriality
Financial authorities, like most regulators, exercise the lion’s share of
their power through the supervision of persons, businesses, and activities
within their borders. As organs of the state, they wield a long
acknowledged power over “territory” largely considered the hallmark of
a country’s sovereignty under international law. 5
Defining geographic borders for regulatory purposes is not always a
straightforward matter. 6 Instead, jurisdiction over financial matters
often arises through what can be described as territorial proxies. In
countries with national banking regulators, jurisdiction is generally
asserted (and thus territorial contact made) where an institution or
branch takes deposits from persons in that jurisdiction. 7 Meanwhile, in

5. Sovereignty is generally conceptualized as the “exercise [of] supreme authority over a
territory carved on the physical map of the world.” Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws:
From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 n.3 (2002) (citing JARROD WIENER,
GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 8 (1999)). See also Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty:
An Introduction and Brief History, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 353, 356–57 (1995) (noting that “Sovereignty is
authority within a discrete land, bounded by borders. . . . [and the] legitimate authority within a
territory.” (emphasis omitted)).
6. This observation holds true not only to the regulation of financial transactions, but also (and
even especially) to corporate governance more generally. For example, under the real seat doctrine, the
authority over a company’s internal affairs belongs to the state in which the company’s central
management decisions are implemented on a day-to-day basis. Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat”
Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 36 INT’L LAW 1015, 1015 (2002). Meanwhile, under the
incorporation theory, the state in which companies are incorporated trigger jurisdiction, thereby granting
promoters choice of law as to what principles should govern the internal affairs of the firm. Id. at 1016.
7. Here the U.S. serves as a partial exception to this rule. To be sure, where a bank takes
deposits in the U.S., it will become subject to regulation by a government entity. However, precisely
which entity will regulate turns in part on the form of charter that a bank selects (e.g., state or national),
though in either case federal regulation applies at least indirectly under Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation deposit insurance supervision.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/3

4

Brummer: TERRITORIALITY AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE: NOTES FROM THE FINANCIA
BRUMMER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED)

3/18/2011 12:58:18 PM

2010] TERRITORIALITY AS REGULATORY TECHNIQUE

503

the case of securities law, territoriality is largely conceived of through
sale of securities to the “public” in a particular jurisdiction or through
the use of an instrumentality associated with securities transactions that
are physically in a jurisdiction like stock exchanges or other centralized
trading venues. 8
Once jurisdiction applies, certain regulatory
requirements take effect. In the case of banks and insurance regulation,
this has meant that foreign banks must comply with capital adequacy
requirements and periodic inspections. Securities firms, meanwhile,
along with issuers, must register with the host country’s national
securities regulator or, in the absence of a national regulator, with the
relevant stock exchange authorities, and periodic disclosures must be
made.
Domestic territoriality is the dominant mode through which financial
risk is regulated. It inherently recognizes the principle that countries
have authority over actions that take place within their borders. To the
extent that any speculative market activities potentially undermine the
welfare of the state, national authorities are well within their right to
patrol, govern, and oversee transactions to ensure that they promoted
national economic objectives. It is as such in its purest form—where
domestic authorities regulate domestic market participants—
uncontroversial from the standpoint of public international law.
Additionally, domestic territorially has historically provided a simple
mode of exerting dispositive regulatory authority. Following much of
the last two centuries, the objects of financial regulation—banks, the
buyers, sellers of securities, and insurance companies—were in large
part domestic actors, and the bulk of the risks their activities generated
were local. By attaching to geographic proxies like branches, stock
exchanges, and the investing public, financial regulations could achieve
a deep geographic coverage touching virtually all “transactions that
occur within its borders, or that have substantial effects within its
territory.” 9
In this way, national regulatory authorities have at least historically
enjoyed what some commentators have described as a “regulatory
monopoly” over the conduct of financial activities in their relevant
jurisdictions. 10 By law, domestic companies would have to comply with
domestic regulations. Similarly, foreign firms would become subject to

8. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1435, 1441 (2008) (describing jurisdiction of U.S. securities regulation).
9. Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in
International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1371.
10. Brummer, supra note 8, at 1440 (discussing presumption of regulatory monopoly in the
literature).
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local laws. As a matter of practice, this has meant that foreign firms are
generally afforded national treatment, which means that foreign firms
are treated no differently from local firms and must comply with the
same rules as their local counterparts.
B. “Extraterritorial” Territoriality
Territorial laws need not necessarily be domestic in effect, a point that
the conflicts of law literature and judges have long pointed out. As we
have seen, at the most basic level, foreign firms operating in a country
will often have to comply with that country’s domestic rules, and thus
internalize the costs and benefits of the relevant regulatory regime. In
such cases, firms may have to make disclosures that are not usually
required under their home regulatory regimes and follow various capital,
corporate governance, and procedural requirements.
Additionally, territorial laws may require not only that foreign
companies be required to comply with the host country’s rules, but also
that their parent companies do so as well. For example, the U.S.
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 has required that all
foreign banks seeking to be licensed as financial holding companies
satisfy risk-based capital standards on a global basis and satisfy the
Federal Reserve (the Fed) that its global operations are well
capitalized. 11 This consolidated form of supervision confers to the Fed
the power to evaluate the operations of international regulators as well
as to conduct inspections of foreign affiliates and foreign regulatory
agencies. 12
Similarly, the European Union’s (EU) Financial
Conglomerate Directive and draft Alternative Investment Fund
Managers Directive only permit operations and access to customers
where the companies and their parent companies either comport with EU
rules or are subject to regulation deemed to be equivalent to that
exercised by federal European regulators. 13
Importantly, extraterritoriality need not be operationalized as de jure
rules “upstreamed” to parent companies and affiliates. For example,
11. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 27 (2005).
12. Other countries are empowered to impose similar restrictions. Id. at 47.
13. Michael Gruson, Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in the European Union (2004),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/gruson.pdf
(describing
consolidated
supervision under the EU Financial Conglomerate Directive); Commission Proposal for a Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending
Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/…/EC, at 10, COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/fund_managers_proposal_e
n.pdf.
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where a regulator imposes a rule applicable throughout its territory, and
a foreign firm establishes a subsidiary in a country to carry out
operations, compliance by the subsidiary can be up-streamed to the
parent company or other international affiliates such that they, too, adopt
the stricter rule. Firm managers may prefer to transact under one set of
rules in order to minimize the transaction costs of operating in multiple
jurisdictions. For example, instead of operating in a country where
standard “x” requires a stricter disclosure standard tied to an offering,
and then hiring a different set of lawyers to facilitate compliance with
standard “y,” a more permissive set of disclosures, in another country, a
firm will merely abide by “x” in order to minimize compliance costs.
This particular kind of de facto internationalization of national
standards is possible where one country imposes certain kinds of
national corporate governance requirements. Take, for example, the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 14 and the EU’s rules on credit rating
agencies promulgated in 2009. 15 Both initiatives would impose on their
respective targets (either issuers of securities under Sarbanes–Oxley or
credit rating agencies under the EU initiative) a requirement the firms
monitor their internal controls and possibly institute new governance
structures and committees. Although both initiatives were directed at
local market participants, their effects are potentially international in
scope because some regulated entities could find it rational to change all
of their operations to reflect these requirements. In that way, common
legal processes and administrative structures can be developed to
harmonize functions across the firms. Companies may be able to
minimize the transaction costs associated with undertaking new
compliance procedures in each jurisdiction. Furthermore, by operating
along the lines of the highest common denominator, legal risk can be
minimized where operations are deeply international, and where
multiple subsidiaries often work across borders.
Similar forms of de facto internationalization of national standards
occurs where a national authority applies rules to its own firms that are
then “passed on” indirectly to foreign clients. For example, as part of its
credit rating agency regulations, the EU has considered and adopted a
14. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
15. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Credit Rating Agencies, at 8, COM (2008) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/agencies/proposal_en.pdf
(describing
proposed
transparency and independence requirements for credit rating agencies operating in Europe); Press
Release, Council of the European Union, Financial Services: New Rules on Credit Rating Agencies,
Bank Capital Requirements, Cross-Border Payments and E-Money, and a Programme to Support the
Effectiveness of EU Policies (July 27, 2009), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/
st12/st12380.en09.pdf.
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range of reforms that would impose elevated capital requirements on
banks, insurance firms, and other financial institutions that enter into
financial transactions whose risk assessments rely in part on credit rating
agencies that have not been registered by EU authorities. 16 The idea is,
at least in theory, born of regulatory policy concerns in the wake of the
credit crisis insofar as authorities wish to ensure that credit rating
agencies are properly supervised and regulated given the extent to which
ratings are used for investment and regulatory purposes. In practice,
however, it also helped the European Union export its preferred policy
approaches by forcing credit rating agencies to register and comply with
its rules if they wished to access and provide competitive services for
European banks and financial institutions.
These examples illustrate that as a regulatory concept, “territoriality”
best describes not so much the effect or scope of law, but instead the
means by which it is generated. Territorial regulation need not be
entirely domestic in its reach. By operating as a gateway to investors,
consumers, and capital, territoriality can be leveraged in a way that can
affect foreign firms—at a minimum those operating in the country—and
potentially, the conduct by foreign regulators as even some parent firms
and affiliates adopt the rules or standards of the exporting state.
Even more importantly from the regulator’s standpoint, territoriality
can potentially afford extraterritorial prudential and supervisory power.
In an age of globalized financial transactions, the appeal of
extraterritorial regulation is obvious. As business activity has become
increasingly cross-border, strong extraterritorial regulation permits
regulators to reach beyond their territories to affect the conduct of
foreign market participants and occasionally foreign regulators.
C. “Direct” Extraterritoriality
As a third regulatory strategy, authorities can adopt purer forms of
extraterritorial regulation that apply more directly to international actors
and activities. This subpart addresses three possibilities, in particular.
First, regulators can apply laws directly and exclusively addressed to
foreign firms. Second, jurisdiction can be structured in a way such that
even the most inconsequential contact with the state triggers its
authority. Finally, jurisdiction can arise wherever foreign acts have an
“effect” on the regulating country.
In the first case, a country could simply pass laws that apply directly
to foreign firms. For example, a country could pass a law that outlaws

16. Council Regulation 1060/2009, On Credit Rating Agencies, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1.
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any bank in the world from engaging in fraudulent conduct with any of
that country’s nationals—even where the depositors are themselves
overseas when transacting with the firm.
Such cases of
extraterritoriality are virtually non-existent in the financial world, in part
because courts themselves are reluctant to take on cases where such little
national interest exists. However, they are at least theoretically possible,
as demonstrated by the Alien Tort Claim statutes and its international
progeny, which permit foreigners to sue for human rights violations that
occur abroad, as well as under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
among other things bars the bribery of foreign government officials by
U.S. persons. 17
As a second course, regulators can assert jurisdiction extraterritorially
wherever foreign companies engage in conduct that has effects in the
country asserting jurisdiction. In practice, this kind of extraterritorial
strategy has been used to most spectacular effect in antitrust actions,
such as where the European Commission, largely on the basis of the
anti-competitive implications the deal would have for European
markers, blocked a merger between General Electric and Honeywell
after the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned it. 18 Effects-driven
jurisdiction has also at times been applied by courts in amplifying the
reach of U.S. securities laws. For example, in Des Brisay v. Goldfield
Corp., a court ruled for plaintiffs where they alleged that an issue of
stock in Canada to insiders of a Canadian company at an unfairly low
price adversely affected the value and price of the company’s shares
listed on the American Stock Exchange. 19 Although fraud was
perpetrated by a Canadian company and the foreign defendant never
entered the United States in connection with the fraud, the Second
Circuit found in part because of the adverse effect on the equity of U.S.
shareholders was sufficient to support jurisdiction. 20
A final subspecies of direct extraterritoriality, similar to effects-based
jurisdiction (and indeed often employed in conjunction with it), arises
through the implementation of what can be considered tenuous contacts
with even territorial proxies. As such, it is best explained through
example, again with reference to the United Stats, which remains the
country most likely to exert extraterritorial financial law. The Securities

17. For a description of the Alien Tort Claims Act, see Harold J. Berman, The Alien Tort Claims
Act and the Law of Nations, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69 (2005). See also Tara Elliott, Note, Risky
Business: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Expand the Reach of U.S.
Courts in a Global Economy, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 211 (2009).
18. See Michael Elliott, The Anatomy of the GE-Honeywell Disaster, TIME, July 9, 2001, at 5.
19. Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1981).
20. See id. at 135.
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Act of 1933 provides that it is unlawful to offer or sell any security
without registering it where there is use of any “means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails.” 21 Meanwhile, “interstate commerce” is defined in the statute to
include “trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or
communication relating thereto . . . between any foreign country and any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia.” 22 As a result, the statute is
silent as to the scope of registration requirements, and it can be
construed to encompass virtually any offering of securities made by a
U.S. corporation to foreign investors wherever say, a telephone call to
the United States is made in connection with the sale of a security
abroad, and exclusively to foreign investors. 23 The rulemaking authority
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has, consequently,
had potentially broad, international implications.
Direct extraterritorial jurisdiction has several clear advantages over
domestic and extraterritorial territoriality. Territorialism’s inherent
limitation—that authority it is tied to certain geographic markers—is at
least theoretically overcome. A regulator can directly address foreign
activities without having to substantiate significant contacts with its
domestic territorial borders.
In this way, activities that have
repercussions for financial markets or a regulator’s national economy,
but that might be consummated entirely overseas, can be addressed
through domestic prudential and supervisory regulation. Consequently,
direct extraterritorial regulation may be able to more significantly affect
the behavior of foreign firms. Additionally, the very promulgation of
international standards or rules could have a deterrence effect with
regards to the possible conduct of overseas actors. And like classic
territorial regulation, it can be wielded unilaterally with no cooperation
required from a foreign counterpart with regards to the promulgation of
the rules, but must, at most, be verified or upheld by domestic judicial
authorities. 24

21. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(2006)).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7) (2006).
23. See Schoenbaum v. Fistbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining the
extraterritorial application of federal securities laws), rev’d en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). For a
detailed discussion of the effects test in securities regulation, see generally Symposium, Oversight by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission of U.S. Securities Markets and Issues of Internalization and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 29 INT’L LAW. 731 (1995).
24. Courts may, of course, themselves impose strict limitations on the power of regulators, the
subject of the conflicts of law literature. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 941. Indeed, often
considerations will involve a balancing of interests between countries. Yet even here, there is a focus on
territorial power that at least historically has often upheld the exercise of extraterritorial authority.
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II. THE DIFFICULTY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPORT
Despite the advantages catalogued above, the unilateral “exportation”
of regulation by national authorities to other jurisdictions—both in its
indirect territorial guise and in its more explicit form—is difficult.
Ultimately, two challenges stymie regulators from acting unilaterally.
The first is what can be considered a “political economy” problem:
regulators, in short, do not act in a vacuum, and where their actions have
negative consequences for foreign regulators, they may punish the
regulatory exporter. The second is the increasingly diverse sources of
finance, a product of financial globalization, which not only exacerbate
the political and possibly economic costs of unilateralism, but also make
extraterritoriality less practical and weaken the incentives for tough
domestic territorial rules.
A. The Political Economy Problem: Reputation and Retaliation
The political economy problem of extraterritorial regulation stems
from the fact that extraterritorial export can spark reactions, some
retaliatory, from other regulators that can imperil a regulator’s ability to
achieve its own long-term strategic objectives.
As perhaps the most basic consequence of extraterritorial regulation,
consider how it can undermine a regulator’s image among its
international peers. The international system generally frowns upon
unilateral extraterritorial conduct, in part because it often implies the
violation of longstanding principles of international law. The very
notion of sovereignty, as discussed supra, demands that states have full
authority over their respective territories, whereas principles of comity,
though not formally public international law, have long required that
governments give effect to the executive, legislative, and judicial acts
(and authority) of other countries. 25 As a result, either directly or
indirectly, extraterritorial legislation is generally found to be an
acceptable practice only where it can be justified by significant interests
of the intervening regulator.
Yet here as well, extraterritorial conduct can have serious
controversial qualities. Even where a regulator has significant interests,
its interests may not necessarily be superior to those of other regulators.
Moreover, even if it believes they are, other regulators may not
necessarily agree, or they may perceive its regulatory response as not
25. Comity encourages restraint and the limited interference by sovereigns in extraterritorial
affairs. Note, Offshore Funds and Rule 10b-5: An International Law Approach to Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 396, 410 (1985).
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being tailored narrowly enough to speak to those interests. Conflicts of
law under such circumstances can generate, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
once mildly noted, “international discord.” 26
Extraterritorial regulation, even when justifiable, generates costs that
are not internalized by the officious regulatory authority or its local
firms, but are instead born by unwitting foreign regulators and market
participants. The assertion of regulatory authority often accompanies
costs for foreign firms that must adjust to new standards or move to
other jurisdictions to avoid a law’s regulatory effect. It also potentially
infringes on the ability of foreign regulators to oversee and supervise
firms the way in which they wish. Firms in an affected jurisdiction may
have to change their corporate governance structure, disclosure
requirements, or register with another national authority, all of which
could undermine the authority of the national regulator. Extraterritorial
regulation can also send signals as to a regulator’s views of another’s
regime, and implies that foreign law is less sound than those practiced
domestically.
As a result, the decision by a regulator to engage in extraterritorial
regulation often erodes its reputation in the international community.
For example, a regulator may appear self-interested and insensitive to
the costs and consequences that its laws may have for other regulators
and firms. Furthermore, the regulator can develop a reputation as less
willing to respect the doctrine of comity and perhaps even international
laws of sovereignty.
A poor reputation can have a variety of adverse consequences.
Perhaps most obvious, as a regulator gains a reputation as self-interested
or uncooperative, other regulators may decide to refrain from
cooperating with it or helping it achieve its strategic objectives. 27 How
would this passive retaliatory conduct look in practice? At a minimum,
a regulator could decide not to help the extraterritorial regulator enforce
its extraterritorial rules when it seeks help prosecuting a violation where
witnesses or the proceeds of misconduct are located abroad in its
jurisdiction. 28 In more dramatic circumstances, a regulator could pull
back from cooperation more generally. It could decide not to engage in
joint regulatory projects—unless, of course, it was directly in its own

26. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
27. This idea has been articulated by a variety of theorists, but for a comprehensive assessment
see ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 71–111 (2008).
28. John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S.
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477, 478 (1997) (discussing how countries
frustrated with extraterritorial laws are often reluctant to enforce judgments).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/3

12

Brummer: TERRITORIALITY AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE: NOTES FROM THE FINANCIA
BRUMMER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED)

3/18/2011 12:58:18 PM

2010] TERRITORIALITY AS REGULATORY TECHNIQUE

511

interest to do so—as well as could refrain from robust information
sharing and enforcement cooperation.
Additionally, a regulator can respond by making its own
extraterritorial rules. 29 In some rare situations, a response might take on
an explicitly retaliatory character aimed at disciplining the
extraterritorial regulator, while in others it may merely take place as a
reciprocal breach in related areas from established principles of comity.
More frequently, extraterritorial conduct may also serve as a kind of
“precedent” justifying extraterritorial regulation in unrelated financial
matters. For example, consider the promulgation of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act, where many European regulators protested what many believed was
Congress’s lack of respect for comity, and complained that the wide
reaching extraterritorial effects would require many firms to reconstitute
their corporate governance fundamentally to meet U.S. standards that
were poorly suited to the way in which firms evolved abroad. 30
Ultimately, their protests were largely ignored and few reforms to the
legislation were made. This event, however, created a precedent for
similar territorial rules enacted by the European Commission when it
enacted stiff corporate governance requirements for (primarily
American) credit rating agencies. And after previously promulgating its
own rules, the SEC was in a weakened position to argue against such
extraterritorial exerts of power.
As a result, the mode of jurisdictional authority asserted by regulators
can be important. It is conceivable, and indeed likely, that traditional
territorial regulation generates fewer political costs than direct
extraterritorial legislation.
Extraterritorial legislation challenges
international law more obviously than even aggressive territoriality
insofar as it is either addressed directly to actions that take place
overseas or at least implicitly does not limit the application of rules
domestically. There are also fewer obvious justifications for it.
Extraterritorial territoriality can at least be justified on the basis that it is
applied domestically, addressing local actors or transactions. Moreover,
where territorial regulation is promulgated, regulators can argue that,
from a fairness perspective, foreign companies voluntarily subject
themselves to host country regulation by coming to the country to do
business. Arguably, firms “opt-in” to the regulatory regime of the host
state. No such justifications are usually available where extraterritorial
29. See GUZMAN, supra note 27, at 42–49 (discussing retaliation and reciprocity as disciplinary
responses in international relations).
30. For an analysis of the difficulties for European companies, especially in Europe, see
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Convergence to Comity in Corporate Law: Lessons from the
Inauspicious Case of SOX, 1 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 269, 272 (2004).
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laws are explicitly addressed to foreign companies and actions taking
place abroad.
B. Financial Globalization’s Brave New (and Larger) World
Regulatory export is also increasingly difficult due to the increasing
diversification of international sources of finance. To understand why, it
is necessary to recognize that regulatory export largely relies on a
regulator’s authority over large, liquid capital markets. Simply put, the
bigger the capital market, the greater the influence of regulators. Larger
capital markets are more indispensable sources of capital for capital or
client-hungry multinationals. As a result, large capital markets amplify
the power of local regulatory authorities. If a capital market is
significant enough to the global economy, its rules can become lex
financiaria—not necessarily the formal international law of finance per
se, but international financial law complied with by firms.
In practice, only the United States has consistently wielded such
authority over the last sixty years. Its securities markets largely dwarfed
those in other countries, and thus most multinational companies seeking
financing beyond their own shores came to the United States to raise
capital on its world-class exchanges. This migration gave the U.S.
national securities authority, the SEC, indirect influence over the
provision of both domestic and global securities rules. Similarly, for
nearly three decades, the country has been able to directly shape and
inform global banking regulations. In order to access U.S. depositors
and serve companies operating in the U.S., foreign banks were
compelled to establish branch offices as a source of dollar funding. In
the process of setting up their outposts, they became subject to U.S.
regulatory jurisdiction and rules on bank entry and operations could be
leveraged to export American banking regulations. 31
However, over the last two decades, globalization has weakened
American financial dominance. Perhaps most notably, the unification of
the Eurozone, notwithstanding the current monetary turmoil in Greece
and other periphery nations, created the world’s largest common market.
And to the extent to which the European Union has established federal
authority over the relevant issue area, it can be an important player in the
international regulatory arena. 32 As previously demonstrated, by
31. William F. Kroener, III, Towards Interdependence: A Decline in U.S. Dominance?, 24 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1135, 1136 (1993).
32. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements,
and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 766 (2010) (noting that where
regulation is harmonized at the EU level, it can play an increasingly important entrepreneurial role in
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pooling sovereignty, consumer markets, and financial markets, EU
countries have been able to project policy preferences in ways once
reserved for U.S. financial authorities. Indeed, the European Union has
frequently been able to prod U.S. authorities to change their own
domestic regulatory course—from credit rating agencies, hedge fund
oversight, and accounting rules—by threatening to wield expansive
forms of oversight in their own markets.
Advances in information and computer technologies have additionally
spurred cross-border investment. Innovations in information technology
have enabled the transmission of up-to-date data concerning securities
traded on capital markets. 33 Earnings reports, government filings, and
market developments can be disseminated via the web pages of issuers,
financial advisors, the government, and online news services—along
with instantaneous quotations on most publicly traded securities.
Equally important, “[t]he new information technologies have brought
instantaneous transmission, interconnectivity, and speed to the financial
markets.” 34 After searching for opportunities online, they can execute
transactions with the click of a mouse or have financial advisors execute
trades on their account, with less concern for the successfulness of
execution or the distance that the trader is from the market. Advances in
communications now make possible the trading on this information from
anyone in the world in a matter of milliseconds. Consequently, money
can instantly flow anywhere regardless of national origin and
boundaries. 35
Initially, these advances helped U.S. financial markets, largely by
enabling the migration of companies to U.S. borders, especially during
the tech boom of the 1990s. 36 With advances in information technology,
foreign countries have been able to develop liquid capital markets and
stock exchanges on their own to service capital hungry firms. This
development has, by extension, enabled even large foreign
multinationals to raise capital outside of the United States. This is
global governance, including in financial regulation); see also Karmel, supra note 3, at 1711 (noting that
“changing economics, and in particular the migration of many international issuers to the London
markets, has given the EU more power in influencing the SEC”).
33. Brummer, supra note 8, at 1459–60 (describing changes in stock market microstructure).
34. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 43
(1996).
35. Id. at 40. Indeed, as a conceptual matter, capital has always had a high “exit” potential when
compared to other potential objects of regulation. Christian Tietje & Matthias Lehmann, The Role and
Prospects of International Law in Financial Regulation and Supervision, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 663, 669
(2010).
36. See Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on the Regulation of
Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 626– 27 (2010) (describing the tech boom of the
1990s).
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perhaps most evident in the securities space when examining the initial
public offerings of companies on exchanges outside their respective
countries of domicile—so called global Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).
Here, the United States has experienced a dramatic decline in its market
share from 44.5% in 1996 to just 10.1% in the first nine months of 2007.
It has also experienced a decline in global IPOs in terms of value, as its
share has declined from 58.8% in 1996 to just 7.7% through the first
nine months of 2007. And in 2007, none of the twenty largest global
IPOs were done in the United States. Many of these losses over the last
decade have flowed to London, which since the 1980s (and the
introduction of various technological and deregulatory programs) has
hosted well over three times the foreign companies than the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Furthermore, London exchanges have
increasingly attempted to attract not only foreign listings, but also U.S.
domiciled companies. In this respect, the London Stock Exchange’s
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was particularly successful over
the last decade, attracting thirty-seven of the forty-three U.S. companies
listing solely on overseas exchanges between 2002 and 2008. 37
Increasingly, exchanges in South America and Asia are becoming
players in the industry. In 2007, Brazil, Russia, India, and China
(BRIC) accounted for $106.5 billion of the total $255 billion raised in
IPOs worldwide. 38
Though less data is available on the issue, economic theory suggests
that globalization could similarly impair the traditional dominance of the
United States with regard to banking. Although the dollar has
periodically strengthened (and weakened) at different times during the
crisis, financial activity continues to migrate overseas to emerging
markets. 39 And with this migration, U.S. banks have followed the
37. Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1067, 1093–95 (2008) (“This data becomes all the more salient when one takes into account a
simultaneous decline in cross-listings in the United States. Even companies that do IPOs abroad may
still cross-list their securities and in the process become subject to the country’s reporting requirements
and antifraud regimes. As a result, even where the United States does not capture IPOs, it could
possibly capture securities transactions through secondary trading. Available data suggest[], however,
that foreign markets have not only been more successful in attracting IPOs, but have also kept crosslistings from migrating to the United States. The share of U.S. cross-listings since 2000 . . . has declined
dramatically. Only twelve new cross-listings were transacted on the major U.S. exchanges in 2003, the
lowest number of new cross-listings since 1989. Furthermore, [the most popular forms of cross-listings
were in 2004 and 2005] at their lowest level since 1992. This trend, along with the overall decline in the
United States’s global share of IPOs, strongly suggests a decline in both the U.S. share of securities
transactions and, by extension, its market as a provider for securities laws.” (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
38. See Olesya Dmitracova, Emerging Markets to Boost IPO Activity in 2008—E&Y, REUTERS,
Dec. 16, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1526789720071217.
39. Valentine V. Craig, China’s Opening to the World: What Does It Mean for U.S. Banks?, 17
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money and consequently are subject to foreign regulatory supervision. 40
Equally important, U.S. current account deficits have both stoked fears
for the currency and calls by foreign governments and creditors to
diversify out of the currency, and over time, replace it. 41
At a minimum, the changes wrought by globalization and changing
economic dynamics portend a range of important strategic implications
for territorially based regulation, both for the United States and the
world. First, the development of foreign capital markets has made the
evasion of any one country’s rules easier for many actors. Not only is
there greater technical ability for capital and market participants to
transact in foreign locales, but there is also greater reason to do so.
More financial centers offer greater liquidity, reliable expertise, speed,
and a global array of market participants. Plus customers and clients can
themselves move and transact in foreign markets. As a result,
territoriality as a technique has more limited repercussions than ever
before. Instead of acting as an outright determinant for firms and
investors, prohibitions and rules often can be evaded by moving crossborder, which, though not costless, can create a “choice of law” for
market participants. 42 Thus, in response to both the United Kingdom’s
(UK) 2009 decision to levy higher taxes on investment bank profits, and
the EU’s new draft legislation on hedge funds, some have reportedly
moved from the UK (and the Eurozone) altogether, to Switzerland. 43
Additionally, financial globalization has strained the practicability of
extraterritorial export. Globalization implies that more transactions are
taken in more places by more individuals and firms. As a result, as it
accelerates, increasing resources must be devoted to both the monitoring
and enforcement of territorial rules. Enforcement in such a world
becomes increasingly difficult. Often, resources will have to be devoted
to the adjudication of claims and the potential explosion of cases to be
settled in domestic courts. Furthermore, in order to prosecute (or sue)
BANKING REV. No. 3, at 6 n.24, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/
2005nov/article1.pdf (noting that foreign banks had established over 200 representative offices in China
by mid-2004).
40. As recently as 2004, for example, foreign banks in China operated under licenses that
restricted them to specific clients and to certain geographical areas. And even there they have been
restricted to provide financial services in nonlocal currencies to foreign firms. Id.
41. See, e.g., Jeremy Gaunt, U.N. Panel Urges Replacing Dollar with Currency Basket,
REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://www.gata.org/node/7280 (describing calls by different
governments and a United Nations panel to explore replacing the dollar with a synthetic currency).
42. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
43. Matthew Lynn, Bankers Will Follow Hedge Funds to Switzerland, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 13,
2001, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=ap19tV54PWuE; Zachery Kouwe,
Europe Moves Ahead with Tough PE/Hedge Fund Regulation, DEALBREAKER, May 7, 2010,
http://dealbreaker.com/2010/05/europe-moves-ahead-with-tough-pehedge-fund-regulation/.
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violators of extraterritorial laws, the assistance of foreign regulators will
be needed where violators or witnesses are located abroad. Assistance
may not be forthcoming because foreign counterparts may not accept or
agree with the merits of the substantive rules seeking to be enforced.
Such difficulties recently emerged where Germany sought to institute a
ban on naked short selling of various investment instruments, and the
British Financial Services Authority, declared that such a (unilateral)
ban would not apply to branches of German institutions outside the
country. 44
Finally, financial globalization has helped spur greater regulatory
competition and a burgeoning “market” for financial regulation. 45 This
development has led to weakening of territoriality in some regards from
the inside out. Thus a variety of rules, including exemptions for private
placements (transactions between sophisticated investors) and offshore
transactions from certain procedural and disclosure requirements, have
been implemented in most developed countries explicitly to avoid the
extraterritorial application of domestic securities laws. Instead, only
those functions considered most key to regulatory missions are pointedly
exterritorial. 46
Meanwhile, wherever financial authorities assert
44. Clara Ferreira-Marques, FSA-German Short Ban Does Not Cover UK, REUTERS, May 19,
2010,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE64I1SX20100519?feedType=RSS&feedName=
domesticNews.
45. See Brummer, supra note 8 (describing the “market” for securities laws enabled by financial
market globalization); see also Eric J. Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us 9 (Benjamin
N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 176, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=951705. See also Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 53 (1999) (noting the
increasing importance of regulatory competition issues in international relations).
46. In this case, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is “unlawful for
any person . . . by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . [t]o . . . employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any [unregistered security] any manipulative or deceptive
device.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2006)). Section 3(a)(17) of the Act then defines “interstate commerce” broadly to encompass
“commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign country and any State.”
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(a)(17), 48 Stat. 881, 882, 884 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(17) (2006)). Thus any minimum contact with the U.S. “in connection with” a foreign
transaction would bring the transaction within the jurisdictional scope of § 10(b) and under the
jurisdiction of U.S. authorities. Because of the flexibility and potential scope of § 10(b), U.S. courts at
times have been enablers of expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction by the U.S. government. For example,
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, a U.S. court held that U.S. securities laws were intended to have
extraterritorial application to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect domestic securities markets from effects of improper foreign
transactions in American securities. 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), rev’d en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968). In the case, the court permitted U.S. shareholders to bring a derivative suit against a
Canadian corporation for damages to the corporation resulting from the sales, in Canada, of stock to
foreign purchasers under the theory that the directors and defendants conspired to defraud Banff by
making Banff sell treasury shares at below their true value. Id. at 208. Similarly, in United States v.
Tarkoff, U.S. courts tried a lawyer for processing illicit funds even though the violation occurred in
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extraterritorial rules, either directly or indirectly, foreign firms are often
excused from some of the most burdensome or costly compliance
requirements.
C. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Territorial Power: A Global
Perspective
At least initially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, some
question arose as to the sustainability of the “rise of the rest” and the
continued growth of non-U.S. (and indeed, non-Western) financial
centers. This is because although the 2008 crisis originated in mature
markets, and exchanges in New York and London fell to historic lows,
the financial fallout from the crisis quickly spread around the world.
The McKinsey Global Institute recently reported that in emerging
markets, the total value of financial assets fell $5.8 trillion in 2008, a
loss of 15%. 47 Meanwhile, capital flows to developing countries, both
in the form of portfolio investment and foreign direct investment,
plunged 39%. 48 As foreign lending flows reversed, and debt and equity
flows diminished, the cost of fund-raising skyrocketed in many
emerging economies. 49 For this reason, it was at least theoretically
possible that countries would suffer long-term capital flow reversals
reminiscent of those arising in the wake of the Asian and South
American financial crises of the 1990s.
However, the year 2009 brought about wholesale reversals in these
trends. After a weak first quarter, private capital flows to emerging
markets resumed and quickly gathered pace in the second, third, and
fourth quarters. 50 Much of this investment took the form of portfolio
investment, with emerging market mutual funds attracting a record $80
billion during the year. 51 Meanwhile, global IPO activity picked up,
especially in Asia, where the Shanghai and Hong Kong exchanges have
been important gateways to capital for Chinese corporations seeking
relatively low cost, low disclosure venues for offerings. As a result, in
2009, China was the world’s largest IPO market, 52 just as BRIC
Israel with an Israeli bank and the only connection with the U.S. was that the Israeli bank transactions
required telephone communication between Israel and Miami, Florida, and between Miami, Florida and
Curacao, to arrange for the transfer of funds from Curacao to Israel. 242 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2001).
47. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: ENTERING A NEW ERA 27 (2009).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. J. Alex Tarquinio, Emerging Markets Make a Comeback, NY TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at 14;
Conrad de Aenlle, Emerging Markets Regain Footing, NY TIMES, July 12, 2009, at 14.
51. Tim Gray, How to Gauge the Rush to Emerging Markets, NY TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at 14.
52. See Vivian Wai-yin Kwok, China: The World’s Biggest IPO Market, FORBES, Sept. 29,
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countries accounted for 76% of global IPO activity during the first
month of 2010. 53
The flow of money back to emerging markets is explained by a
general lack of confidence in the economies of developed countries,
specifically in the United States and Europe, causing investors to seek
greener pastures in less traditional locales. In short, emerging markets
exhibit better growth prospects given their advantageous economic
fundamentals. Due to global trade imbalances, many emerging
countries have larger foreign reserves, less sovereign indebtedness, and
superior household finances and savings rates than their more developed
counterparties. 54 As a result, global investors are more confident in
emerging markets’ ability to grow in spite of economic malaise in the
United States and Europe, an optimism grounded in both real and
expected growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of emerging
economies. 55
Additionally, the maturation of many foreign financial centers has
appealed to some investors, who previously viewed emerging markets
only as risky or speculative investment locales. Most commentators
agree that Asian securities markets, though far from perfect, have come
a long way in regards to disclosure and regulatory supervision. For
instance, since 1998, China has created a central securities regulator,
promulgated its first securities law, reduced the number of non-tradable,
state-owned shares in its equity markets, and relaxed restrictions on
foreign institutional investors seeking to invest in its markets. Brazil has
also taken steps to strengthen the reputation of its financial markets: In
2001, the World Bank announced a $14.46 million loan to Brazil to help
it strengthen its Central Bank and Securities Commission, and the
country has also been working to improve corporate governance and
investor voting rights in connection with a set of priority initiatives
promulgated by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD).
These regulatory reforms in the securities law coincide with
ostensibly well-keeled regulatory supervision of banking sectors in some
emerging markets. In Asia, in particular, depositary institutions have
thus far fared well in the wake of the crisis, even as some question their
2009.
53. See Sujata Rao, BRIC IPOs See Record January at $6.7 Billion, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2010.
54. See John Stepek, Emerging Markets Will Be the Winners From This Crisis, MONEYWEEK,
June 15, 2009, available at http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/emerging-marketswill-be-the-winners-from-this-crisis-15672.aspx.
55. David Oakley & Christopher Brown-Humes, Emerging Market Debt Benefits From Greek
Woes, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/04129faa-53bb-11df-aba000144feab49a.html.
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domestic banking practices. 56 With presumably more conservative
lending standards and lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis,
banks in the region are asserting themselves as more prudent than their
Western counterparts. Only 5% of the approximately $500 billion writeoff by banks globally from January to August 2008 were done so by
Asian banks. 57 Instead, banks in North America accounted for half of
the total write-offs; according to Bloomberg, banks in the United States
accounted for half, and European banks accounted for 45%. 58 This
success has helped lend a veneer of credibility and stability to the entire
financial system and have helped encourage capital flows to the region
as well as Asia’s increasing influence as an international lender. Not
surprisingly, many industry observers expect this trend to continue into
2010, with net private capital flows to emerging markets expected to
exceed $670 billion, and even more over the next decade helping to fuel
dramatic growth in emerging market GDP. 59
Assuming this track record remains untarnished, which at the time of
this writing is unknown, these developments will likely serve to only
exacerbate changes in the global political economy previously
outlined. 60 On the one hand, mobile market participants will continue to
have expanded choice as to where they seek capital, and in some
instances, what rules govern their transactions. Furthermore, countries
that were once only remote destinations for capital now wield more
regulatory clout and are better positioned to check extraterritorial
exertions of influence by traditionally leading countries. Thus, for
example, the United States now imposes regulatory standards on foreign
companies by means of its own capital market activity; regulators in not
56. See Chia-Peck Wong, China Property Prices Jump, Highlighting Bubble Risk, BLOOMBERG,
Mar.
10,
2010,
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601206&sid=aO9xOGXjsJUo.
57. See Capital Guardian Trust Co., Asian Financials: Time to Shine in China and Hong Kong,
TO THE POINT, Oct. 2009, available at https://server.capgroup.com/capgroup/action/getContent/file/
GIG/North_America/Market_Insights/Capitals_Views/TTP_AsiaChina_1009_CG.pdf.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., INST. OF INT’L FIN., CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (2009),
available at http://www.iif.com/press/press+119.php; Gillian Tett, Bankers Sense Shift in Capital Flows,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at 6, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bd0cb8e6-06f5-11df-b05800144feabdc0.html.
60. It is after all notable that China in particular may face significant write-offs with regard to its
own imprudent domestic lending in real estate, much like the U.S. Vishesh Kumar, China Curbs Bank
Loans as Asset Bubble Worries Grow, DAILYFINANCE, Jan. 20, 2010, available at
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/china-curbs-bank-loans-amid-bubble-worries/19324151/.
Some
experts contend, however, that even in the event of such bubbles “bursting,” the domestic fallout would
be considerably less than that in the 2008 crisis in the U.S. Katie Benner, What Happens if China’s
‘Bubble’ Pops?, FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 2010, available at http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/05/news/
international/china_bubbles.fortune/index.htm.
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only Europe, but also Asia and even South America increasingly enjoy
their own exterritorial reach through their domestic capital and
consumer markets and can affect the operations of U.S. multinationals to
a historically unprecedented extent. 61 As a result, greater reflection is
required by regulators of the traditionally dominant financial centers
when they attempt to unilaterally solve global capital markets
challenges—and indeed even domestic capital market challenges.
III. THE FUTURE OF TERRITORIAL REGULATION
Multipolarity in the international system will have important
implications for the regulatory strategies pursued by national authorities.
First, it will generate pressures for greater international coordination,
which will reflect a new democratic distribution of economic and
territorial power. Second, national authorities will draw on new
strategies that help leverage both their historical prestige and residual
financial power. Yet even with both developments, territoriality will
remain an important factor informing regulatory export.
A. Greater International Coordination
Perhaps most obviously, there will be a greater dependence on
international regulatory coordination. Administrative agencies, once
content with largely domestic regulatory strategies, have hired personnel
with not only market know how, but also foreign policy expertise as
foreign policy analysts, experts and area-specialists often work
alongside traditional regulators and enjoy civil service tenure.
Moreover, the general trend of technocratic control has accelerated via
further specialization by and in regulatory agencies. Virtually every
regulatory agency charged with domestic supervisory responsibilities—
whether it be financial ministries, securities regulators or banking
authorities—has instituted an “office of international affairs” of some
sort to spearhead cooperation efforts with international homologues. A
key aspect of such work involves the promotion of national policy
preferences abroad, a charge that often involves both persuading
homologues to regulate in ways that are consonant with the policy

61. As in other forms of extraterritoriality, the policy consequences have been most obvious in
the antitrust space, where China is increasingly blocking international deals with only secondary
implications for its markets. Editorial, Antitrust in China, FIN. TIMES, May 4, 2009 (noting that China’s
Ministry of Commerce imposed restrictions on the $1.6 billion takeover by Japan’s Mitsubishi Rayon of
the UK’s Lucite international, forcing the latter to sell half of its production of one polymer at cost, as
well as restrictions on InBev’s $52 billion acquisition of Anheuser-Busch).
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preferences of the respective administrative agency.
Regulators have also revamped efforts aimed at achieving broader,
global forms of international coordination. In 2008, just as the U.S.
financial crisis blossomed into a cross-border, international economic
event, regulators undertook a variety of efforts to revive and reorganize
the global financial architecture. For example, the G-20 has been
christened the primary body for international financial decisionmaking,
in effect superseding the erstwhile dominance of the G-7 and expanding
the number of countries with input on the global regulatory agenda. 62
Meanwhile, the Financial Stability Forum has been reorganized as the
Financial Stability Board to promote international financial stability
through better information exchange and international cooperation. 63
The mandate of the new organization focuses on monitoring potential
risks in the economy, especially those involving the biggest firms, and
will conduct periodic reviews of firms to spot potential trouble and
report possible threats to the stability of the global financial system to
the G-20 finance ministers, the IMF, and central bank governors. It will
also act as a clearing house for information-sharing and contingency
planning for the benefit of its members. 64
Greater international coordination is envisioned to help achieve a
range of international regulatory goals. First, it helps achieve better
information sharing among regulators. In that way, greater trust can be
achieved as well as points of common interest. 65 Second, international
organizations can help craft norms that can help influence the norms and
expectations of investors as to what practices market participants should
be complying with.
Finally, to the extent coordination is
institutionalized, new reputational and institutional disciplines can be
generated that provide new incentives for regulators and markets alike to
comply with high international standards.
B. The Strategic Redeployment of Soft and Hard Power
Regulatory authorities are also seeking to leverage their soft and hard
power more strategically than ever before. To heighten their powers of
62. What is the G-20, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2010)
(describing the G-20’s mandate).
63. See Eilís Ferran & Kern Alexander, Soft Institutions and Hard-Edged Power: What Role for
the European Systemic Risk Board? (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
64. Fin. Stability Bd., Mandate, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2009).
65. See Rolf H. Weber, Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and
Supervision, 13 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 683, 696 (2010) (noting that international laws help mitigate potential
conflicts between national regulators and increase the potential for mutual reliance).
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persuasion, they have, for example, increased outreach efforts with
developing and emerging markets. In this regard, technical assistance
programs have been particularly successful instruments of soft power.
By providing guidance to other, usually less developed, counterparts in
developing markets on issues relating to financial sector development,
regulatory authorities have enhanced their ability to promulgate policy
preferences in less confrontational low-level forums. They are also able
to bolster the prestige of their agency in the international community of
regulators.
Some regulators are also seeking to exercise extraterritorial influence
in ways more amenable to foreign jurisdictions. For example, consider
the SEC’s “mutual recognition” program launched as a direct regulatory
response to financial globalization. 66 This program—formally initiated
in 2008 as a pilot project with Australia, though stalled in the wake of
the credit crisis—works, in ways akin to “extraterritorial territoriality,”
to affect the behavior of both market participants and their regulators. It
works against a deregulatory backdrop, instead of as a new and
potentially unwelcome extraterritorial projection of power: as opposed
to imposing stricter guidelines on firms and exporting them abroad, the
purpose of the program is to offer relevant market participants ways to
escape U.S. territorial control.
Specifically, instead of being subject to direct SEC supervision,
foreign stock exchanges and foreign broker–dealers would apply for an
exemption from SEC registration based on their compliance with foreign
regulations deemed to be comparable to those in the United States. To
establish a framework for such exemptions, the SEC would, along with
its foreign counterpart, sign a non-binding mutual recognition
“arrangement” laying out in basic terms their intent to liberalize market
integration. At the same time, memoranda of understanding would be
signed allowing for enhanced enforcement cooperation and informationsharing. 67 This arrangement would also contain an undertaking by the
foreign regulator “describing in detail how certain regulatory
preconditions required by the SEC are met, and a similar undertaking by
the SEC providing for reciprocity.” 68 Once the SEC blessed the laws of
their home jurisdictions, stock exchanges and broker–dealers in those
countries would then be permitted to apply for exemption from SEC
registration based on their compliance with their home state laws, and
66. For a description of the mutual recognition program, see generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert
J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48
HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007).
67. Id. at 32.
68. Id. at 56.
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shares traded on or through them, could be marketed and sold to U.S.
investors without complying with U.S. disclosure and corporate
governance rules. 69
Although the SEC’s mutual recognition program could, if ultimately
implemented, significantly liberalize U.S. markets, the architects of the
program ultimately view the program as providing key incentives for
foreign counterparts to adopt U.S.-style regulations. Despite the fact
that convergence in some instances might be costly or involve the
adoption of rules that are contrary to a regulator’s traditions or
philosophy, the regulator’s domestic market participants could
potentially enjoy a range of important competitive advantages,
especially over other market participants in non-participating
jurisdictions. They would not have to register their securities to access
capital markets in the United States. Instead, only compliance with their
home state regulator would be required. Furthermore, exchanges in the
complying jurisdiction could also potentially enjoy greater liquidity.
Regulators hope these advantages would change the net payoffs for
regulators such that the importation of U.S. law is the preferred policy
choice.
Whether, by itself, capital market access can comprise a meaningful
lever for change is far from clear. As a policy strategy, it will only work
in a finite number of circumstances. First, mutual recognition likely
works best on a bilateral basis where a regulator of a big, capital rich
market, offers a mutual recognition policy with the regulator of a smaller
market with capital hungry firms seeking to raise money from overseas
markets. In such circumstances, the regulator of the smaller market will
likely find it acceptable that its firms make some adjustments in order to
access clients, customers, and investors abroad. Agreements between
regulators of large or rapidly growing markets may be difficult, given
the aggregate adjustment costs of firms in the adjusting regulator’s
market.
Otherwise, mutual recognition programs will only be feasible where
adjustment costs for the target regulator are low. This will be the case
either where standards by the rules-exporting regulator are softened, or
where (as with Australia’s mutual recognition agreements with New
Zealand and the United States) jurisdictions already share largely similar
regulatory regimes and thus requiring only small adjustment costs. In
either scenario, the use value of capital markets incentives weakens.
The fewer the requirements for mutual recognition, the fewer the
number of required regulatory concessions an exporting jurisdiction

69. Brummer, supra note 8, at 1454.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
BRUMMER FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED)

524

3/18/2011 12:58:18 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

must make. Meanwhile, if countries are already similar, then the value
derived from mutual recognition as a leverage instrument is limited and
should be better recognized and understood as a mechanism for market
liberalization, and potentially, the decline of state intervention.
C. “Conserved” Territoriality
The limitations of even regulatory suasion returns us to the basic
observations outlined at the outset of this Section: unilateral, territorially
based regulatory export is increasingly difficult—both practically and
politically. As emerging economies grow and as the global distribution
of economic and financial power evolves, the reputational costs of
export become more significant just as enforcement of territorial rules
abroad becomes more difficult.
Nevertheless, territoriality remains a key factor of regulatory power—
and indeed international regulatory affairs. Nation–states—and by
extension, regulatory agencies—still wield total formal authority over
resources and capabilities in their territories. As a result, international or
global standards must be agreed upon domestic members and
implemented on a national basis. Indeed, for this reason, in the wake of
the crisis, new reforms reflect an emphasis not so much on strengthening
formal international organizations, but instead on the “softer” process of
international coordination and cooperation. 70
Moreover, the evolving allocation of financial capital and resources
merely changes the calculus of regulatory power as others come to wield
influence in their own right. In many ways, the burgeoning, multipolar
world of financial regulation operates along what can be considered a
“conservation theory” of international financial law insofar as regulatory
power is not so much destroyed, but transferred. In practical terms, this
means that although some actors, like the United States and the EU,
may experience diminished powers of extraterritorial export, others will
be able to enjoy greater national economic sovereignty insofar as
perceived interference or intermeddling by other national authorities are
reduced. Furthermore, new regulatory capabilities are becoming
available to other countries and regions that allow them to project power
and influence in ways that were once only enjoyed by the United States
Changes in the global financial economy can shift the burden of noncooperation. To the extent to which agreement cannot be reached
between regulators, the costs of discensus, once at least partially evaded

70. Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of the International Financial Architecture After the Global
Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 81, 90–91 (2009).
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by traditional regulatory superpowers like the United States, who could
export de jure or de facto their preferences with few repercussions, are
now internalized as independent responses by other regulators and can
increasingly affect the welfare and profitability of domestic firms. As a
result, territoriality helps reshape the incentives and bargaining power of
regulatory actors on the international stage.
Globalization does not, however, necessarily mean that interests
between regulatory authorities are themselves becoming “polarized.” In
some instances, the development of domestic markets and stakeholders
may drive countries towards a convergence of interests, especially with
regards to the regulation of practices that hold broadly negative
economic or financial consequences. Furthermore, as financial centers
develop and gain breadth, the interests of regulators and market
participants may change as countries transition to more broadly accepted
standards in order to enhance their legitimacy or to improve the
reputation of domestic financial services. On the other hand, where
regulatory practices diverging from international standards are viewed as
the primary drivers to a financial center’s success, its regulators may
resist standards more rigorously.
Yet financial globalization highlights in stark terms, especially in the
wake of the crisis, that no one regulator can singlehandedly impose its
will globally on all actors, all the time. Territoriality can help project
power, but ultimately it, like extraterritoriality itself, does not ensure it.
This is because territoriality both defines and is defined by financial
power. Regulators exercise through their markets capabilities that are
checked directly and indirectly by the regulatory power engendered by
the strength of other foreign markets. As a result, regulators across
national boundaries are increasingly interdependent not only from the
standpoint of affirmative regulatory governance, but also from the
perspective of strategic deference from one another—both with regards
to their territorial and directly extraterritorial activities—so as not to
unduly undermine one another’s supervisory activities or the activities
of regulated firms.
CONCLUSION
Territoriality is a remarkably complex regulatory strategy in an age of
financial globalization. Long employed to describe the confinement of
regulatory power to national borders, territoriality actually constitutes a
diverse array of strategies used by national regulators to exert regulatory
authority over often mobile market participants. It is not only a limit of
state power, but can also operate as the means by which regulatory
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power is projected beyond national borders, especially for countries
enjoying large capital and customer markets. This Article argues that
the implications of territoriality are rapidly evolving. Formerly
dominant regulatory powers are witnessing the weakening of the
territorial approach to both domestic and international influence,
whereas others are discovering within their borders more meaningful
and significant levers of global regulatory power. These challenges,
which have only accelerated in the wake of the crisis, have spurred new
efforts at international coordination and innovative initiatives among
traditional regulatory leaders aimed at leveraging their residual hard and
soft power to promote their national policy preferences abroad. Yet
even here territoriality will remain an important factor informing the
coordination process.
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